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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy 
for Contemporary Perspectives 
on Transpersonal and Spiritual Experience
I. The Later Foucault and Pierre Hadot 




While Michel Foucault is chiefly known for his historical relativism and his critique of 
modern institutional power over the individual, his late writings, as further extended by 
Pierre Hadot, centered on the post-Socratic spiritual practices of the experience of here and 
now presence or Being in the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. For Foucault the positive, 
expansive self-actualization common to these traditions, and contrasting with Christian 
self-renunciation, offers a guidance for a contemporary spiritual crisis in valuation of the 
person. For Hadot each of the post-Socratic traditions was based on the imitation and 
further development of key characteristics of Socrates, much as the charismatic figure of 
Jesus inspired the multiple forms of earliest Christianity. These post-Socratic practices of 
the Hellenistic-Roman era are examples of what Max Weber termed a this- or inner-worldly 
mysticism, in contrast to both the more other-worldly mysticisms of the East and the Judeo-
Christian prophetical traditions, and saw as the most likely line of spiritual renewal in the 
modern secularized West.  Examples of this form of spirituality are reflected in the Sufi 
influenced Gurdjieff-Ouspensky movement, Jung’s Self, Maslow’s self-actualization, and the 
Diamond-Heart approach of Almaas. Foucault and Hadot locate its specifically Western 
historical geneaology, which, given Jung’s controversial concerns over adopting spiritualities 
outside one’s own cultural tradition, may offer some context and direction amidst presently 
contending New Age and transpersonal spiritual understandings.
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Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is best known for his detailed analyses of the unprecedented power of modern institutionalized knowledge 
over an increasingly “objectified,” endlessly “accountable,” 
and “normalized” individual, as best reflected in his 
interpretive histories of prisons and madness (Discipline 
and Punish, Madness and Civilization). His approach 
here is broadly comparable to Heidegger (1949/2012) 
on the “enframing” of a technological attitude in 
which everything—including persons as well as natural 
environment—becomes potential “commodity” for 
a “calculative,” purely utilitarian attitude. It is also 
reminiscent of the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1963; 
Radkau, 2011) on the unique “rationalization” and 
“disenchantment” of modern materially driven life (see 
also Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
 Within a more formal philosophical context 
Foucault is also known for his rejection of any universal 
phenomenology of consciousness, understood in the 
sense of Husserl, as primary or “constitutive” of meaning 
and society—and which in transpersonal psychology is 
sometimes seen as the underlying source for a mystical 
core for all religions. For the early Foucault consciousness 
and experience of self varies across historical eras and is 
Keywords: Stoicism, Epicureanism, Socrates, inner-worldly mysticism, numinous 
experience, constructivism, presence, personal essence, Gurdjieff-Ouspensky, self-
remembering, Nietzsche, early Christianity
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itself largely constituted by the unconscious structures of 
language, society, and economy (The Order of Things, The 
Archeology of Knowledge). At this stage, consciousness 
for Foucault was entirely epi-phenomenal—an after-
the-fact “fictive” construction (Jay, 2005). Foucault’s 
(1972) rejection of what he termed the “transcendental 
narcissism” of a primary phenomenology of conscious-
ness was later still echoed in his distrust of what he 
encountered personally in the 1980s as what he termed 
the “California cult” of a “true self,” in the sense of a 
universal structure to be simply uncovered by the 
techniques of meditation and psychedelic drugs with 
which he experimented at the time (Foucault, 1983a).
 So it is interesting to find the later Foucault, 
especially in his final lectures between 1981 and 1984 
(The Hermeneutics of the Subject, The Government of 
Self and Others, and The Courage of Truth) even more 
than in his final books being edited at that time (The 
Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self ), returning to the 
importance of the subject as part of his concentration 
on the Post-Socratic, Hellenistic and Roman, spiritual 
practices of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. He 
saw this tradition of cultivating a “care of the self” 
or “aesthetics of existence” as offering an alternative 
guidance for the ethical crises of modernity, in contrast 
to what he regarded as the secularization of a Christian 
“self-renunciation” that would falsely subordinate the 
more positive or cohesive sense of self now needed.1  In 
an interview from 1984 he stated:  
From Antiquity [i.e., these post-Socratics] to 
Christianity, we pass from a morality that was 
essentially the search for a personal ethics to a 
morality as obedience to a system of rules. And 
if I was interested in Antiquity it was because...
the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of 
rules is now disappearing...And to this absence...
must correspond the search for an “aesthetics of 
experience.” (Foucault, 1984/1988a, p. 49)
And in a 1983 essay:
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity 
through the refusal of this kind of individuality 
that has been imposed on us for several centuries. 
(Foucault, 1983b, p. 216)
 Foucault’s late concentration on what he 
understood as the spiritual practices of the Stoics, 
Epicureans, and Cynics, as offering a potentially liberating 
spiritual guidance for the modern individual, was later 
extended by another French philosopher, Pierre Hadot 
(1922 - 2010), whom Foucault cited for support in his 
own analyses. Hadot is best known for his re-valuation of 
these post-Socratic philosophies as spiritual practices most 
similar to key aspects of Eastern meditative traditions, 
rather than primarily as conceptual systems. Hadot’s 
phenomenologically based views concentrate on post-
Socratic techniques of cultivating a sense of numinous 
presence or Being (What is Ancient Philosophy, The Inner 
Citadel, The Present Alone is our Happiness).  As will be 
shown below, Foucault’s and Hadot’s “geneology” of post-
Socratic spiritual practices places them within Weber’s 
(1922/1963) typology of religions as forms of the “inner” 
or “this worldly” mysticism which both Weber and his 
colleague Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992) saw as the direction 
of potential spiritual revival in the modern secularized 
West, and of which much of current transpersonal 
psychology is both example and its own analysis.2
Return to the Subject in Later Foucault
Much of Foucault’s early critique of the centrality of the subject and consciousness was based on 
his intense skepticism concerning the inclusive meta-
theories of an essential human nature appearing in 
the new disciplines of late 19th and early 20th century 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology (The Order of 
Things, The Archeology of Knowledge). He saw these as 
immanent naturalistic substitutes for the transcendent 
overview of the boundaries and essence of the human 
condition associated with the already secularizing 
Judeo-Christian tradition—implicitly replacing the 
God whose “death” had been proclaimed by Nietzsche. 
These attempts at “social scientific” paraphrase must 
ultimately fail for Foucault since they leave us entirely 
“inside” our own being, with no quasi-external stance 
from which to conceptually encompass our historical 
contingency, particularity, and myriad variation. 
Foucault’s prediction of the inevitable demise of these 
original macro-theories in the human sciences seems 
confirmed by their subsequent splintering, by the mid 
1990s, into the current hyper-specializations of myriad 
subdisciplines, based almost entirely on the more 
“objectified” statistical methods equally appropriate to 
the physical sciences. This seemingly inexorable shift 
from the interpretive systems of early psychology and 
sociology to a primacy of methodologies of measurement 
and statistical probability can be taken as illustrating 
Foucault on a contemporary “episteme” of objectification 
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and accountability—extended from technologies of 
economic production to the utilities of persons.
 Along with this historical attenuation of 
interpretive and phenomenological approaches, one 
can see the present marginalization into a specialized 
subdiscipline of the dimension of consciousness, including 
its spiritual or transpersonal expression, which had been 
foundational for the early more qualitative meta-theories 
of the human sciences. Indeed it is striking to see the 
centrality of explicit theories of religion and spirituality, 
whether understood reductively or more constructively, 
in the work of James, Fechner, Freud, Jung, and Baldwin 
in psychology, and Durkheim, Weber, Tylor, Frazer, and 
Levy-Bruehl in sociology and anthropology. Foucault’s 
intuition of these traditions as already endangered “place 
holders” for a secularizing religiosity is also confirmed 
by the widespread appeal of early psychology and social 
science to many of its pioneers as a way to seek some 
resolution for their own personal crises of religious belief 
—as the ideal place to attempt a reconciliation, one way 
or the other, of the collisions of science and religion. It is 
also striking how many of these early pioneering figures 
either had fathers who were pastors or had themselves left 
an initial ministerial training (Hunt, 2003; Taylor, 1999).
 So it seems significant that Foucault’s return 
to the subject is associated with his own attempt at a 
geneology of Western spirituality in the context of what 
he saw as contemporary ethical dilemmas of personhood 
and personal cohesion. In his 1981-1982 lectures, The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, he suggested that the subject 
or self is at least partly defined, in contrast to his earlier 
cultural relativism,  by an intrinsic “ontological freedom.” 
This is always implied by our potential for “resistance 
to power”—that the individual is never entirely 
determined by the largely unconscious “structures” of 
institutionalized knowledge and power. In a 1983 essay 
he stated:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and 
only insofar as they are free,...faced with a field of 
possibilities in which several ways of behaving may 
be realized....Slavery is not a power relationship...it is 
a question of a physical relationship of constraint....
The relationship between power and freedom’s 
refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated. 
(Foucault, 1983b, p. 221)
 Foucault’s renewed interest in an intrinsic 
dimension of the subject and subjectivity is associated 
with a more complex understanding, replacing his 
earlier extreme cultural constructivism, in which the 
singularities of experience arise from the continuous 
interplay of three more or less universal dimensions, 
endlessly intersecting and tumbling over each other, and 
with no one considered primary or foundational. In his 
1982-1983 lectures, The Government of Self and Others, 
he defined these three co-dependent and co-defined axes 
of experience as follows:
1) A dimension of “power”, with which his earlier 
work was chiefly pre-occupied, now defined in terms 
of practices or “technologies” of  “governance” and 
normativity 
2) A dimension of “knowledge,” defined in terms of 
cultural technologies of truth “veridication”  
3) The dimension of the subject, defined in terms of 
“technologies of self transformation” that elicit different 
“modes of being,” and which are most developed in any 
society in its spiritual practices and traditions.  
With respect to these latter he stated, in a late interview:
I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, 
founding subject, a universal form of subject to 
be found everywhere...I believe, on the contrary, 
that the subject is constituted through practices of 
subjection, or in a more autonomous way, through 
practices of liberation...as in Antiquity, on the basis 
of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions 
to be found in the cultural environment. (Foucault, 
1984/1988a, p. 50)
While the techniques of an ultimately spiritual self 
transformation are culturally provided, their degree 
of pursuit or resistence always involves for Foucault 
a component of personal choice and ability. In terms 
of recent research we might speak of an individual 
difference dimension of “imaginative absorption” or 
“openness to experience” as leading into a spontaneous 
fascination with the spiritual and transpersonal (Hunt, 
2000, 2003).
Foucault on Spiritual Practices, 
Spiritual Knowledge, and Bataille on Ecstasy
Foucault stressed that while different spiritual traditions can reflect very different cultural values, 
their techniques overlap strikingly:
There is in all societies...another type of techniques; 
of operations on their own bodies, on their own 
souls...so as to transform themselves...to attain a 
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certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, 
of supernatural power, and so on. Let’s call this kind 
of techniques a technology of the self. (Foucault, 
1980/1999, p. 162)
These techniques included purification and purgation, 
the use of oracle and dream interpretation, isolation, 
breath control, the contemplation of death, and 
meditative concentration. In the Western tradition he 
located some of these practices in Socrates, the earlier 
Pythagoreans, and expresses interest in views that they 
would extend back into shamanism.
 Spiritual practices are defined as producing 
a “spiritual knowledge” that changes one’s “mode of 
being” or “subjective being”:
Spirituality...postulates that for the subject to 
have right access to the truth he must be changed, 
transformed...and become to some extent, and up to 
a certain point, other than himself....[by] something 
that...fulfills or transfigures his very being. (Foucault, 
1981-1982, pp. 15-16)
Accordingly, Foucault distinguished the “spiritual 
knowledge” that transforms one’s “mode of being” from 
the now broader intellectual and scientific knowledge 
whose full understanding does not involve or require 
such inner transformation.  He separated earlier 
Western spiritual traditions, where all forms of truth 
had spiritual implications, from what he terms the 
“Cartesian moment” of the modern scientific era, where 
science and religion become increasingly independent. 
Here Foucault is reminiscent of both Max Weber 
(1922/63) and Jung (1938/1958a) on their differentiation 
of religious or sacred eras, where spiritual knowledge is 
central to the larger culture, as in medieval Christianity, 
the early Renaissance, and the post-Socratics, from more 
secularized eras. In the “disenchantment” of modernity 
spiritual knowledge becomes its own separate enclave, 
and the individual no longer feels “at home” in a 
universe in which a larger macrocosmic and “objective” 
knowledge bears no relation to the “merely” subjective 
human microcosm (see also Hunt, 2011; Tarnas, 2006).
 In this regard it is worth considering 
contemporary transpersonal psychology itself as another 
version of this modern separation that Foucault is 
addressing. It begins with William James’ Varieties of 
Religious Experience and his suggestion of a mystical 
or numinous core to the world religions, which James, 
and later Jung, understood as a “natural” function that 
confers a sense of higher or superordinate meaning and 
purpose in human existence. Yet James and Jung both 
realized that while such “higher states of consciousness” 
can be studied in terms of their phenomenology and 
empirical effects on peoples’ lives, they can in themselves 
offer no “proof” of their conceptual content, which 
remains persistently outside what Foucault would term 
the larger “episteme” of contemporary science. While this 
is especially obvious in the recently popular “scientific” 
refutations of contemporary evangelical religiosity, it is 
also true of some more “new age” mystical spiritualities, 
which do attempt some degree of integration with 
quantum and cosmological physics (Hunt, 2001, 2006). 
While significant for an innovative heterodoxy in both 
psychology and physics, these attempts remain either 
unknown or anathema to most mainstream academics 
in university departments of physics, chemistry, and 
biology.
 Foucault’s discussion of this modern separation 
of spiritual knowledge from the larger secular culture 
helps in retrospect to understand both his own earlier 
appreciation and ambivalence concerning the writings 
of the French philosopher Georges Bataille (1954/1988; 
1967/1989) on ecstasy, as expressed in Foucault’s 1963 
essay, “A preface to transgression.” Bataille anticipated 
important aspects of contemporary transpersonal 
psychology. In his expressionist, at times surreal, book 
Inner Experience he understood ecstasy, or what Otto 
(1917/1958) termed numinous experience, in post-
Nietzschean terms as a natural and human capacity 
that becomes automatically “transgressive” in both a 
cultural and personal sense in a secular age.3 Bataille’s 
definition of ecstasy includes the great religious mystics, 
although he argued that any interpretation in terms of 
a supernatural God distorts its more human nature. 
Accordingly, his definition is broadened to include 
erotic bliss, intense laughter, dance, ritual violence, and 
all manner of intoxications. Ecstasy for Bataille is the 
experience of Being within the unfolding moment, as 
a state of inner sovereignty, freedom, and potential for 
pure intimacy. For Foucault, Bataille’s ecstasies are very 
real “limit experiences” of the discursively “impossible.” 
Foucault’s own ambivalence here appears in his statement 
that while such felt sovereignties “...must be recognized 
some day and we must try to assimilate them” (Foucault, 
1963/1977, p. 38-39), yet such intense ecstasy is like a 
brilliant flash of lightning on a dark night—in that 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 5Foucault and Hadot on This-Worldly Mysticism
the darkness of the night is actually intensified in its 
wake. The brief illuminations and felt significances of 
spontaneous and psychedelic drug induced ecstasy in 
the modern setting, for Foucault, actually intensify a 
subsequent “night of nothingness,” as a black despair 
and sensed futility. In hindsight they can seem like 
“mere” subjectivities lost within an era of pervasive 
“objectification.”
 Not only can one see something of this negative 
aftermath in the reactive despair of what has been 
popularly termed “suicide Tuesday” in the wake of 
weekend long, rave overuse of the drug Ecstasy, but also 
in a late interview where Foucault discussed his feelings 
of the importance, yet personal ambivalence, of his own 
drug explorations:
I think that the kind of pleasure I would consider 
as the real pleasure would be so deep, so intense, 
so overwhelming that I couldn’t survive it. I would 
die....There is also the fact that some drugs are really 
important for me because they are the mediation to 
these incredibly intense joys...that I am not able to 
experience, to afford by myself...the complete total 
pleasure and, for me, it’s related to death. (Foucault, 
1983/1988b, p. 12)
 While this is not to judge Foucault himself or 
any serious explorer of psychedelic substances, perhaps 
nothing better underlines the negative side of Foucault’s 
separation of ecstatic experience from the contemporary 
larger culture than much of contemporary recreational 
drug use or over-use. If, as Rudolf Otto maintained, 
numinous states of awe, fascination, and bliss are always 
schematized or interpreted as part of the very fabric 
of their experience, as most obviously seen within the 
cultural variations across the world mysticisms (Katz, 
1978; Hunt, 2012), then the contemporary societal 
segregation and rejection of drug experiences will risk 
their actual schematization by, and reinforcement 
of, the larger context of personal alienation, social 
disengagement, and sensed futility that their usage 
actually seeks to overcome, or at least compensate. It 
may be this dilemma that Foucault was locating in the 
experiences of Bataille, and partly describing in his own 
life.
 If, with Martin Jay (2005), we apply Foucault’s 
later understanding of experience as an emergent 
constellation of only partially separable dimensions 
of knowledge, normativity, and subjectification to 
Bataille’s ecstatic “limit-experiences,” it seems clear that 
“experience” is no longer something entirely derivative 
and epi-phenomenal. While it arises out of a multitude 
of dimensions, these now include the “forms of 
subjectivity” central to Bataille. Experience for the later 
Foucault is both a resultant and a potentially separable 
component of that resultant. Following Jay (2005), 
“experience” in Foucault’s sense of the immediately 
undergone limit situations of death, sexuality, crime, 
madness, and mysticism is best approximated by the 
German word erlebnis. This refers to an immediately 
undergone, pre-reflective “state of consciousness.” 
Meanwhile, “experience” in the sense of an emergent, 
derivative constellation of dimensions, which will 
include and transform erlebnis, is best represented by the 
word erfahrung—as experience in the sense of a more 
temporally extended, relationally unfolding “event.” 
 Where experience predominates as resultant 
constellation it includes Foucault’s subjectification 
processes of self-identity. This is the sense of self 
specifically disrupted and suspended by the ecstatic 
experiences of maximum intensity central to Bataille. 
For Bataille and Foucault these experiences are also open 
to both intimate sharing and varying degrees of cultural 
appropriation. In his own life Foucault sought out such 
limit-experiences in the homoerotic sexual adventuring 
that led to his death from AIDS, and in the drug 
experiences to which he alludes.
Foucault and Hadot 
on the Contemporary Relevance 
of Post-Socratic Spiritualities
Given the later Foucault’s concern with a contemporary cultural segregation of new forms of 
spiritual experience, it is of particular interest that he came 
to see the post-Socratic practices of self transformation, 
while no longer open to simple imitation or revival, as 
nonetheless offering a potential spiritual guidance for 
the present. Specifically, these traditions would point 
toward a larger ethical renewal for the more positive and 
cohesive sense of self needed to deal with the complexities 
of institutionalized power within contemporary society. 
Here it is illuminating to compare Foucault on these 
“care of the self” or “aesthetics of existence” traditions 
to Pierre Hadot’s later development of the same material, 
since they both refer to each other—with Foucault 
citing the earlier essays of Hadot for initial support 
and justification. Both came to see these philosophical 
movements as spiritual practices and disciplines in their 
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own right, rather than more traditionally as primarily 
conceptual systems. Where Hadot will concentrate 
on the Hellenistic Stoic, Epicurean, and neo-Platonist 
cultivations of an experience of inner presence or Being, 
Foucault focuses more on the Roman era of Stoic, 
Epicurean, and Cynic experience of inner autonomy, 
freedom, and social responsibility.  
The Later  Foucault
 In his 1981-1982 lectures, The Hemeneutics of 
the Subject, Foucault contrasted the positive sense of 
spiritual self development in the post-Socratics with 
what he saw as the later Christian emphasis on self 
renunciation, sinfulness, and the personal confession of 
intensely private matters to an external authority. Both 
in these lectures and in his final posthumous books, The 
Use of Pleasure (1985), and The Care of the Self (1986), he 
also contrasted the Stoic teacher as spiritual guide and 
guru, with the medieval Christian confessor as examiner 
and moral judge. Where the post-Socratics viewed 
sexuality as primarily a matter of personal hygiene and 
mental balance, about which one can make “mistakes” 
that can be corrected or “mastered” through meditative 
discipline, the traditional Christian view was of sex as 
“original sin,” revelatory of hidden moral limitations that 
require unlimited interrogation and decipherment. It is 
the later secularization of this distrust and renunciation 
of self that Foucault finds so dangerous in the modern 
setting.
 Indeed it does seem that systematic distrust of 
the individual, and a self-justifying obsession with one’s 
“accountability,” has become an underlying implication 
of modern institutional life. Foucault questioned this 
normative acceptance of continuous scrutiny and 
accountability, whether self-administered, institutional, 
or scientifically based. He also saw this reflected in 
the very Western contemporary preoccupation, indeed 
obsession, with the new “science” of sexuality. Foucault 
(1978a) questioned whether such preoccupation could 
ever be part of any genuine sexual liberation. For the 
Greeks and Romans sexuality and gender could never be 
the inner essence of one’s essential soul or personhood, 
and in this Foucault seems to have found support for 
neither hiding nor making a personal politics of his own 
homosexuality (Carrette, 1999).
 It is of interest that Foucault’s turn from a 
secularized Christian self renunciation to the positive 
spiritual self of the Stoics comes in the same decades that 
saw an analogous shift in psychoanalytically oriented 
psychotherapies from the decipherment of hidden and 
unconscious motivations to a more predominant concern 
with the cohesion of sense of self (Kohut) and an inner 
sense of presence, being, and feeling real (Winnicott and 
Bion), both highly congruent with Maslow’s (1962) self 
actualization and its inner sense of realized identity as 
Being (see also Hunt, 2003).
 Both Foucault and Hadot begin their 
interpretation of this alternative Western spirituality 
with Socrates, but to somewhat different effect. 
Foucault’s Socrates is fundamentally concerned with the 
“governance” or “care” of self, which must be developed 
first before it can be naturally and spontaneously 
extended to help others. Foucault agreed that the proper 
care of oneself is ontologically and ethically prior. Here 
he is on Socrates in a late interview:
He would greet people in the street...with the 
question: Are you caring for yourself?  For he has 
been entrusted with this mission by a god and he 
will not abandon it even when threatened with 
death.  He is the man who cares abut the care of 
others.  (Foucault, 1984/1997, p. 287)
 Foucault (1981-1982) emphasized that the 
methods of self transformation one finds in common to 
Socrates himself and the later Stoics, Epicureans, and 
Cynics, including meditative concentration, periodic 
social withdrawal, and the contemplation of death, 
should be considered primarily as spiritual techniques. 
He cited in this regard the terms they used for these 
techniques of inner transformation, such as “inward 
conversion,” “reversion to the self,” “inner awakening,” 
and askesis, the latter in the sense of Weber on the “ascetic 
practices” that Foucault speculated can be traced back 
into shamanism.
 While regarding the post-Socratic spiritualities 
as potential guidance for the present, at the same 
time Foucault is not uncritical of these traditions.  He 
separated their more spiritual level, cultivating the inner 
daimon or “Zeus within,” from a more popular “art of 
living” level of the later Roman era, associated with 
the more inward attitude needed as civic involvements 
became more dangerous, and which in Weber’s terms 
would constitute a later secularization of the post-
Socratic spiritualities.  From a present perspective, 
Foucault (1984/1988c, 1986) saw these latter as risking 
a narrow “elitism,” while the more popular forms could 
fall into a kind of “dandyism” and narcissism. He 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 7Foucault and Hadot on This-Worldly Mysticism
especially admired the later Cynics for their capacity of 
“truth telling” in the face of power.
 Yet all forms and levels of these traditions show a 
this-worldly valuation of personhood, individuality, and 
equality of soul that has traditionally been associated 
only with a Judeo-Christian heritage, and regarded as 
crucial to Western values.  In The Care of the Self  Foucault 
quoted from the Roman philosopher Seneca on the Stoic 
understanding of the soul:
What else should you call such a soul than a god 
dwelling as a guest in a human body?  A soul like this 
may descend into a Roman knight just as well as into 
a freedman’s son or a slave....They are mere titles....
One may leap to heaven from a slum.  (Foucault, 
1986, p. 86)
What is striking here from the perspective of Foucault’s 
concern with the modern segregation of “spiritual 
knowledge” is that the positive, emergent sense of self 
and techniques of self transformation common to these 
Hellenistic-Roman traditions are entirely congruent 
with the larger secular culture of today, and this perhaps 
in contrast to some “New Age” interests in Eastern 
and/or Gnostic mysticisms. Thus their potential for 
a contemporary guidance toward a this-worldly “re-
enchantment.”
  With respect to the cosmologies of the Stoics 
and Epicureans, it is worth noting that their very 
different understandings of physical cosmos also 
resonate with some aspects, albeit often heterodox, of 
modern physical theory (Hunt, 1995, 2001). There is 
some consistency between Stoic physics, where the world 
is held together by a living force “moving of itself” and 
causing things to “spring up” (Diogenes Laertius, vol. 2, 
p. 253), and current interests in dynamic self organizing 
systems in physical nature. Similarly, recent linkages 
between quantum micro-physics and consciousness, 
actually put forward by Neils Bohr (1934), are already 
present in the Democritean connection between the 
chance combinations of atomic particles and the inner 
spontaneity of experience, which was central to the 
materialism of Epicurus. Conceptually at least, much 
of the super-structure of Western physical theory can 
trace its geneaology back into Greek and Hellenistic 
science, which was fully coordinated with post-Socratic 
spiritual practices. What potential this may offer for the 
re-integration of a separated spiritual knowledge within 
Western mainstream culture remains to be seen. It is not 
yet clear whether the sociological hyper-differentiation 
foreseen by Weber will leave self-organizing complexity 
theories and quantum consciousness as their own 
segregated heterodox enclaves, along with any respective 
integrations with New Age spiritualities, or whether the 
larger renaissance Foucault found lacking could still 
prove possible. 
 Finally, on the more strictly philosophic side of 
Foucault’s later thought, his concentration on spiritual 
self-transformation of an inner “mode of being” does seem 
to have at least tacitly re-introduced a phenomenological 
orientation to consciounsess, certainly not in the sense of 
Husserl’s universal foundation of meaning, but perhaps 
more in the sense of Heidegger’s (1927/1962) analysis of 
an implicit structure of Dasein. If experience is finally 
understood by Foucault as the continuous intersection 
and cross-determination of the three dimensions of 
power, knowledge, and the subject, and the first two 
have their own complex determining structures, then 
by implication, Heidegger, who Foucault (1984/1988c) 
cited, after Nietzsche, as the major influence on his 
development, is describing “states of Being” that have 
their own implicit structure. For Heidegger this appears 
as the sense of care or concern as we face toward the 
continuous “carry forward” of time into a permanent 
“horizonal openness.” The early and later Heidegger 
understood this “being experience” as implicit in an 
everyday life “temporalizing” as specific life situations, 
but it is the felt sense of Being as such that would 
be exteriorized in the “intensifying concentration” 
(Heidegger, 1919/2013) of mystical experience—as 
the full “reflectance” of our “self-aware existence” 
(Heidegger, 1919/2008).  
 In Foucaultian terms one could speculate 
that such spiritual states represent experience where 
the dimension of subject relatively predominates in 
its determinations over the dimensions of power and 
knowledge. These latter will more commonly constrain 
and direct that “flow of experience” in the way that 
water, which also has its own patterns, can take the 
shape of what contains it. Certainly it is the latter 
that Foucault saw as predominating in contemporary 
cultural structures of “normativity” and accountability. 
It is of interest then that Foucault’s (1954/1993) first 
published paper was a loosely phenomenological 
analysis of Binswanger’s Heideggerian understanding 
of the inner freedom of dreaming.  There dreaming, as 
spontaneous response to cultural and personal history, 
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is also never entirely reducible to it. Foucault’s final 
centering on the dimension of subject and “states of 
Being” seems a partial return to a modified existential-
phenomenology that also becomes central for Hadot 
(2006, 2011).
Hadot on a Post-Socratic This-Worldly Mysticism
 Hadot also begins with Socrates, but less with 
the self-governance of Foucault, than the guidance of an 
inner daimon, and the courage and detachment it allows 
in the face of social pressure, legal prosecution, and 
imminent death (Hadot, 2002). For Hadot each post-
Socratic school seeks the imitation and formulation of 
key characteristics of the person of Socrates, very much in 
the way early directions of Christianity where inspired by 
differing aspects within the charismatic impact of Jesus. 
Thus the Skeptics imitated Socrates’ aporetic capacity 
for acknowledging the “not knowing” of what cannot 
be truly or finally known—what Keats later termed 
“negative capability.” The Cynics, Foucault’s main focus 
in his last lecture series during 1983-1984 and recently 
published as The Courage of Truth (2011), emulated the 
public guidance offered by Socrates, his concern for the 
ethical welfare of others. The Epicureans concentrated 
on the Socratic eudaimon, or inner peace and tranquility. 
For them the pleasure of Being itself is the most subtle 
bliss possible for human beings, on the same level as the 
detached, contemplative gods. So all cruder pleasures of 
body and emotion must be minimized and mastered, 
much as with the Stoics, so that this experience of Being 
can arise and predominate. Finally, the Stoics sought 
principally the Socratic ataraxia—that capacity for 
inner autonomy and detachment they termed the “Zeus 
within.” Its development would allow the discrimination 
of what was within one’s control and what was not, 
with the acceptance of the latter as a manifestation 
of the Divine Will to which one must align and daily 
surrender. This continuous meditative openness to events 
as spontaneous manifestation of the divine was the core 
of Stoic practice (Epictetus, 2nd century).
 All these traditions emphasized the same 
detachment in the face of persecution and death, and 
Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 
(3rd century) recounted individual tales of courageous 
martyrdom reminiscent of the early Christians. 
Hadot (1998, 2002) is struck by the way in which 
differing conceptual systems among these post-Socratic 
traditions were associated with the same spiritual 
practices, suggesting that they reflect essentially the 
same movement, one inspired by the lived example and 
inspiration of Socrates—in contrast to the more purely 
metaphysical systems of the later Plato and Aristotle. 
Instead, these were primarily spiritual practices, centering 
on a meditative concentration on the experience of Being 
or presence in the moment, more reminiscent in terms of 
technique with the meditative traditions of Taoism and 
Sufism (Izutsu, 1984), rather than what is traditionally 
termed “philosophy.”
 For Hadot there is a common capacity for a 
“cosmic consciousness” that is shared across the later 
Stoics, Epicureans, and more obviously mystical neo-
Platonists such as Plotinus (Hadot, 1993), conferring 
a sense of being “at home” in the universe as then 
understood by Hellenistic science. Here is Hadot on this 
experience of Being or presence:
The Stoics and Epicureans invite us...to live in the 
only moment in which we live, that is the present...
as though we only had this day, only this moment, 
to live....as though we were seeing the world for the 
first and for the last time...The recognition of this...
sacred character of life and of existence will lead us 
to understand our responsibility toward others and 
toward ourselves. (Hadot, 2011, p. 166, 189)
For Heidegger (1938/1994), and it would appear for 
Hadot as well, this experience of Being is at the core of 
Otto’s sense of the numinous awe, wonder, and bliss of the 
mystical states more or less common to the world religions.
 This would be the place then to locate these 
post-Socratic spiritualities both in terms of Max Weber’s 
(1922/1963) extensive typology of world religions and the 
approximate coordination of the latter with variations 
within characteristic forms of transpersonal or numinous 
experience (Hunt, 2003). Weber distinguished between 
more mystical-experiential and prophetical-ethical 
orientations, and within each of these between more this- 
or inner-worldly and other-worldly attitudes. In inner-
worldly spirituality one’s realization/salvation is based 
on practice within everyday social living, rather than the 
retreat into more isolated communities or monasteries. 
The post-Socratic spiritual traditions, with their 
emphasis on an aesthetics of existence and cultivation 
of presence within the everyday social order would be 
examples of Weber’s this-worldly mystical orientation, 
in contrast to the “world rejecting” mysticisms of neo-
Platonism, Medieval Christian monasticism, and Eastern 
Buddhism and Vedanta, and further contrasted with the 
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this-worldly ethical propheticism of traditional Judaism, 
Pauline Christianity, and the Protestant Reformation 
and its Puritan sects.
 To stay with the contrastive forms of more 
mystical-ecstatic states, Laski (1961) distinguished two 
directions of development in the felt transformations 
of personal identity or sense of self. On the one hand, 
there is the dissolution of self into an all-one Absolute, 
as in Plotinus and much of the other-worldly Eastern 
mysticisms. On the other, there is the felt enhancement/
transformation of self that one finds in the Stoics and 
Epicureans. The psychology of this dimension of identity 
transformation is reflected in Jung’s (1959) concept of 
the Self, which he considered most fully realized in the 
persons of Jesus and Buddha. It is also central to Maslow’s 
(1962) description of the peak or numinous experiences 
of self actualization, where one’s sense of identity 
becomes Being itself – “I am” experiences that evoke felt 
autonomy, love for others, and joy.  
 Almaas (1988) has subsequently distinguished 
two overlapping forms within this sensed expansion of 
self. First there is what he has termed “personal essence,” 
as the spontaneous synthesis of an authentic autonomy 
with empathic sensitivity and care for others, which 
one finds in Socrates himself, Stoic teachings, and 
Cynic practices. Second, there is what Almaas termed 
experiences of one’s “essential identity” as Being, which 
is most explicitly developed in the Epicureans. While 
inner-worldly mysticism, with its positive transformation 
in self identity, is found especially developed in aspects of 
Taoism and Sufism (see Izutsu, 1984), its most traditional 
Western form is actually to be found in the post-
Socratics. Its more contemporary New Age expression 
appeared in the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky movement, not 
in its more other-worldly neo-gnostic metaphysics, but 
in the Sufi influenced technique of “self remembering.” 
This is a kind of extraverted meditative practice, in the 
midst of everyday social life, cultivating and sustaining 
an immediate sense of presence or existence. Its 
successful practice, while especially difficult in the midst 
of social involvements in which we normally “lose” 
ourselves, sounds very much like the sense of clarity, 
freeing detachment, and expansive joy of Maslow’s “peak 
experiences” of Being (Ouspensky, 1959; DeVilaine-
Cambessedes, 1997). Gurdjieff groups practice this 
cultivation of ongoing presence with each other in much 
the way practiced within the Epicurean “gardens,” the 
retreat areas to be found in every major city during 
the Hellenistic era—a dispersion which Gurdjieff, and 
contemporary Almaas Diamond-Heart groups, hoped to 
emulate in the modern West (Hunt, 2003).4
 Both Weber (1922/1963) and his associate 
Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992) can be seen as anticipating 
for the later 20th century an inner- or this-worldly 
mystical direction of spiritual renewal among the 
educated middle classes, one more than borne out by the 
psychedelic and New Age mystical movements of the 
1960s, as the predominant response to a contemporary 
secularization, disenchantment, and loss of Judeo-
Christian religious belief. It follows from Weber and 
Troeltsch that any genuine re-newal, apart from the 
reactive fundamentalisms of more traditional groups, 
would need to be mystical, in order to compensate for the 
exhaustion of an earlier and predominant prophetical-
ethical religious tradition. Meanwhile, the form of such a 
re-newal would need to be predominantly “this-worldly” 
to be consistent with and appeal to our historically 
unprecedented materialism and individualism—
itself for Weber the secularized embodiment of the 
this-worldly Christian values of “on earth as it is in 
heaven.”  Developing their analyses largely independent 
of the sociologies of Weber and Troeltsch, and outside 
transpersonal and New Age circles, it seems strikingly 
prescient that Foucault and Hadot would arrive at 
the post-Socratic Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics, the 
major Western traditions of a this-worldly mysticism, 
as offering the major guidance for any contemporary 
spiritual renewal that might re-balance an ethics of the 
modern subject in a society that they see, with Weber, 
as over-rationalizing, technologizing, and objectifying 
both individual and natural world.
Similarities of Post-Socratic Spirituality 
to Earliest Christianity
Despite Foucault’s emphasis on a post-Socratic “aesthetics of existence” as an alternative to 
Christian self-renunciation, and what he considered 
the dangers today in our largely unconscious 
secularization of the latter, there are partial parallels 
between these two “this worldly” movements, and 
especially so when one considers the very earliest form 
of Christianity still linked to the historical Jesus. These 
parallels emerge from the analyses of both Foucault 
and Hadot, explicitly for Foucault in his treatment of 
the Roman Cynics, and more implicitly in the strong 
implication of Hadot’s phenomenology of post-Socratic 
presence or Being experiences in early gospel accounts. 
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The Christianity Foucault rejected in terms of its 
contemporary secularization is based on the post-5th 
century emergence of the confessional and what he saw 
as its subsequent emphasis on inquisitional interrogation 
and self-distrust of all privacy and inwardness. Other 
than his analysis of the Cynics in his final lectures, 
one does not know what else he might have made of 
the very earliest Christian era, since the draft of his 
book on Christianity, which he hoped to modify based 
on his final lectures, was held back from publication 
(Carrette, 1999; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
Foucault and the Cynics
 Foucault, in his final lectures on The Courage 
of Truth (2011), along with the historian of Jesus, John 
Crossan (1994), was struck by the parallels between the 
Roman era Cynics, in particular, and the early Christian 
Apostles, as well as with later Christian mendicant 
orders, such as the early Franciscans and more heretical 
Waldensians. Both the Cynics and Christian Apostles 
were committed to the ethical and spiritual guidance 
of others. Both followed a path of homeless wondering, 
foregoing family, marriage, and children, and returning 
a persistent care and love for others in response to any 
resulting abuse. In Crossan’s terms, “Both are life-style 
preachers, advocating their position not only by word but 
by deed, not only in theory but in practice” (Crossan, 
Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography, 1994, p. 137). Crossan 
concluded that the early followers of Jesus would have 
been initially understood at the time as populist Cynics. 
As inner/this worldly spiritual practices, one more 
mystical, the other prophetical, both seek the social 
transformation of everyday life.
 Foucault was also struck by significant 
differences, with implications for a present guidance, 
centered ultimately around the “free spokenness” 
(parrhēsia) of the Cynics in “speaking truth to 
power.”  The Cynic goes forth alone, emphasizing a 
fierce self sufficiency and autonomy, the Apostles in 
small communal groups. He begs for food, while they 
exchange a communal reciprocity of hands-on healing 
for shelter and meals. The key difference for Foucault 
is in the positive sense of self in the Cynic: The Cynic 
is a
universal missionary of mankind, who watches over 
men whatever they may be doing...which people 
quarrel among themselves, which household enjoys 
peace....All this is the Cynic’s mission, which is 
nothing other than the reverse, positive side of his 
detachment. (Foucault, 1983-1984, p. 301)
This emphasis on autonomy and aggressive ethical 
challenge sounds very different than Christian Agape.
 Accordingly the Cynic turns the other cheek 
in response to inevitable abuse from freely confronting 
the ethics of others, not out of humility and self-
renunciation but out of a kind of inner pride, presence, 
and freedom.  Following here Foucault’s own reliance on 
Epictetus (2nd century), Cynics, who are understood as 
civically committed Stoics, aim to evoke their own sense 
of presence, detachment, and inner sovereignty (the 
Zeus within) in others. They reflect a kind of extraverted 
Stoicism, in contrast to what Epictetus (vol. 2) regarded 
as the “madness” of the Galileans (p. 363). Indeed, one 
would never confuse Diogenes telling Alexander the 
Great to stand out of his sunlight with the early Apostles 
evocation of universal forgiveness and love. The overt 
provocations of the Cynics are actually more reminiscent 
of the Sufi “way of blame,” later adopted in the behavior 
of Gurdjieff, where unconventional and even outrageous 
behavior is used as a form of teaching that tests and 
challenges (Bennett, 1973; Toussulis, 2010).
 One can infer that it would be such challenges 
to “normativity” and institutional empowerments that 
Foucault himself would find more suited to the present 
than a humility of self surrender and renunciation—
whether that negation of self is Christian or takes the 
very different form of meditative Buddhism, which he 
also questioned in this regard (Foucault, 1978b).
Presence/Being Experience 
in Early Gospel Accounts
 The experience of immediate here and now 
presence, with its felt qualities of freedom, joy, and 
timeless eternity, which Hadot saw as the explicit focus 
of post-Socratic spiritual practices, is also strongly 
implied within the earliest gospel accounts of the pre-
crucifixion teaching of Jesus, while largely occluded 
under the later future oriented narrative schematizations 
of Resurrection and Apocalypse. This would be the 
implicit “mystical element” at the core of prophetical as 
well as mystical religion for Troeltsch (1931/1992). It is 
interesting that Gurdjieff, who on occasion referred to 
his “fourth way” movement as an “esoteric Christianity,” 
said that it is impossible to sustain the Christian ideal 
of love and forgiveness, other than through an effortful 
and often failing struggle, without the lost capacity for 
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the spontaneously empowering experience of Being still 
inferrable in earliest Christianity.
Such as we are we cannot be Christians....Christ says 
“love your enemies,” but we cannot even love our 
friends...In order to be a good Christian one must 
first be....(as quoted in Ouspensky, 1949, p. 102)
First one must be able [to be], only then can one love. 
Unfortunately, with time, modern Christians have 
adopted the second half, to love, and lost view of 
the first, the religion which should have preceded it. 
(Gurdjieff, 1973, p. 153).
 If one then asks what would stop or inhibit this 
experience of ongoing presence, both Hadot’s account of 
the Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, along with the 
Gurdjieff/Almaas tradition, will answer 1) preoccupation 
with the past and its sensed guilt, shame, and regret, 2) 
anxieties, fantasizing, and fearful preoccupations about the 
future.  Both take the practitioner equally and powerfully 
away from any capacity to stay in the unfolding moment of 
Being.  Yet what does Jesus, as pre-crucifixion charismatic 
teacher, moving and inspiring large crowds of followers, 
teach?  1) All past sins are forgiven – as a universal 
dispensation depending only on its acceptance and 
extension to a corresponding forgiveness for others 2) The 
eternal kingdom of heaven is already here.  The future and 
death as personal annihilation is no longer to be feared: 
Anyone who...puts his trust in Him who sent me 
has hold of eternal life, and does not come up for 
judgement, but has already passed from death to 
life....He shall never know what it is to die....No one 
who is alive and has faith shall ever die. (John 5: -24, 
8:-51, 11:-26)
To fully feel these teachings from the speech and example 
of Jesus would be to experience a numinous sense of 
timeless and eternal Being, joy, and gratitude (see also 
Hunt, 2012).
 Probably the first person to fully articulate this 
“mystical element” embedded within gospel narratives 
was Nietzsche, himself steeped in accounts of the Stoics, 
Epicureans, and Cynics from his studies of Diogenes 
Laertius, and a major intellectual influence on Foucault: 
Here is Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ:
In the whole psychology of the “evangel” the concept 
of guilt and punishment is lacking....”Sin”—any 
distance separating God and man—is abolished: 
precisely this is the “glad tidings.” Blessedness is not 
promised...it is the only reality....[It is] how one 
must live, in order to feel oneself “in heaven,” to 
feel “eternal”...a new way of life, not a new faith....
The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—
not something that is to come “above the earth” or 
“after death”....Not a faith...[but] another state of 
being...It is plain what was finished with the death 
on the cross: a new, an entirely original basis for 
a Buddhistic peace movement, for an actual, not 
merely promised, happiness on earth. (Nietzsche, 
1888/1954b, pp. 606, 7, 8, 13, 16)
 For Nietzsche, as more recently for Crossan 
(1994), the later schematization and “raising” of the 
death by ignominious crucifixion into the future 
oriented doctrines of Resurrection, Ascension, and 
Return in Judgement will have occluded this more 
spontaneous experience of numinous presence and 
its felt eternity. Bataille (1954, 1967) had originated 
his own phenomenology of numinous experience 
as a natural human capacity based on Nietzsche’s 
accounts of his own personal experiences of ecstasy 
(see also Hunt, 2003).  This is what Nietzsche was 
also locating, with Hadot, in the Stoic-Epicurean 
experience of presence, as well as here in the earliest 
gospel accounts. It could not be more different than 
the later self-renunciation, life-long inner sinfulness, 
and eternally postponed salvation that Foucault 




 The later Foucault and Hadot find in these post-
Socratic spiritualities less an occasion for any would-be 
direct imitation or revival, than a guidance for a needed 
renewal and re-balancing of an “ethics” of the modern 
subject in a society whose institutions and forms of 
knowledge systematically over-rationalize and dominate 
the life of the individual:
one of the great problems of Western culture has been 
to find the possibility of founding the hermeneutics 
of the self, not as was the case in Christianity, on 
the sacrifice of the self, but, on the contrary, on a 
positive, on the theoretical and practical, emergence 
of the self. (Foucault, 1980/1999, p. 180)
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 If, as Foucault suggested, the sense of self is 
largely determined by cultural “technologies of self 
transformation” that are most developed in spiritual 
traditions and practices, then “...maybe the problem 
is to change these technologies” as part of a needed 
“politics of ourselves” (Foucault, 1980/1999, p. 180). 
If so, the “positive self” of the post-Socrates—with its 
inner freedom, sovereignty, and presence—may be the 
better guide to a “new ethics” more fully congruent 
with the emerging culture at large than our powerfully 
secularized version of self-distrust and an institutional 
dominance over the sense of personhood and personal 
presence on which our version of modern civilization has 
been based.
Non Foucaultian
 If Weber and Troeltsch are right that any 
genuine spiritual renewal, in the midst of a modern 
secularization/disenchantment of the Judeo-Christian 
ethical-prophetical tradition, must come from a more 
mystical-experiential direction;
 And if it also follows that our unprecedented 
development of a cultural materialism, utilitarianism, 
and egocentric individualism can only be fully addressed 
and reconciled by a mysticism that is, in Weber’s terms, 
this- or inner-worldly;
 And finally, if Jung (1943/1958b) has at least 
some point, however contentious within current 
transpersonal and New Age circles so often drawn to 
Buddhism and Vedanta, on the problematic basis for 
many in the modern West in seeking the full adoption 
of spiritual traditions entirely outside one’s own culture 
and upbringing;
 Then, in looking for a geneaology of a this-
worldly mysticism within our own cultural traditions of 
the West, one will arrive, courtesy of the later Foucault 
and the subsequent work of Hadot, at the post-Socratic 
spiritual practices of “care of the soul” and its social 
responsibilities of the Hellenistic-Roman era.
 These traditions both by-pass the more other-
worldly New Age appeals of the East and Gnostic 
neo-Platonism, often seen as sanctioning a withdrawal 
from the dilemmas of contemporary society, and avoid 
the reactive prophetical fundamentalisms—Christian, 
Jewish, or Islamic—that from a Foucaultian perspective 
play back into our present society of totalizing 
accountability and subordination of the person.  Instead, 
it would be guidance from the post-Socratic, especially 
Stoic and Epicurean, spiritualities of an emergent self 
of felt presence, that might help address the cul de sac 
of a world view, so forcefully critiqued by Foucault, 
of a pervasive institutionally driven normativity and 
accountability.
Foucault on Experience and its Implications 
for the Transpersonal
  Foucault’s later understanding of experience as 
neither entirely derivative nor entirely constitutive, but 
always a culturally and historically varying interactive 
constellation, fits well with Scheler’s (1923/1960) and 
Buber’s (1957) further amending of Otto’s univerality 
of the numinous in terms of its necessary interaction 
with discursive structures of culture and sectarian 
“schematizations.” Mystical states, while showing the 
cross cultural component also implied by Foucault’s 
“technologies” of spiritual practices, will always entail 
shifting degrees of that interaction (Hunt, 2006, 
2012). With Ferrer (2002), the resulting performative 
and ethical implications of transpersonal states avoid 
the sometimes overstated extremes of both “perennial 
philosophy” and a pure cultural constructivism.
 From a later Foucaultian perspective one 
could suggest that mystical experience, like all human 
experience, is the resultant of multiple interacting 
dimensions. It is an expressive constellation, within which 
there are the core features of numinous states that do 
tend to predominate within the overlapping mysticisms 
of the major world religions. At the same time, mystical 
states are open to a continuous and variable shaping 
by societal, cultural-historical, cognitive, and personal 
patterns.  The later Foucault’s location of specific valuative 
orientations, with a selective relevance and guidance for 
the contemporary West, in the shaping of more or less 
cross cultural “technologies of self transformation” in 
the this-worldly spiritual schools of the post-Socratics 
offers its own support for such an interactive approach 
within transpersonal studies.
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Notes
1. We can be reasonably certain that Foucault’s last 
three lecture series on post-Socratic practices of self 
transformation would point the direction of any 
subsequent book length studies had he lived longer, 
given that his lectures generally anticipated his later 
books by several years and the majority of The Use 
of Pleasure (1985) and the posthumous The Care of 
the Self (1986) were based on lectures immediately 
preceding these final series.
2. Hadot’s concentration on the Stoics and Epicureans, 
as part of a this-worldly spirituality inspired by the 
person of Socrates, came only after his first published 
work on the more other-worldly mysticism of 
Plotinus (Hadot, 1993, first French edition 1963), 
which he gradually concluded was irrelevant to 
what is most significant in ordinary living (Hadot, 
2011). It was the beginnings of this shift, and the 
similar work of Hadot’s wife, Ilsetraut Hadot, that 
Foucault cited as supporting his own approach in 
the Hermeneutics of the Self lectures.
3. Both Foucault and Bataille were strongly influenced 
by Nietzsche, but Foucault’s Nietzsche is centered 
on the geneaological unmasking of cultural forms, 
as in Beyond Good and Evil (1886/1954a), whereas 
Bataille’s Nietzsche is the exemplar of Dionysian 
ecstasy in The Anti-Christ (1888/1954b). This latter 
aspect is approached more indirectly by Foucault 
in his last lectures addressing “technologies” of 
spiritual transformation in the post-Socratics.
4. There is no suggestion here that Foucault, or for that 
matter Hadot, would have been personally interested 
in the more elaborated spiritual schools of Gurdjieff 
or Almaas. What does seem well supported are 
the similarities of these more recent forms of this-
worldly spirituality, in both their core practices 
and understandings of self-identity as presence, to 
the earlier schools of the Stoics and Epicureans so 
central for both philosophers.
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